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[L. A.. No. 21480. In Bank. A.ug. 25, 1950.] 
C. MAYERS et aI., Respondents, v. LOEW'S, INCORPO-
RATED, Appellant. 
[1] Labor-Oollective Bargaining Oontracts-Interpretation.-In 
an action by members of a labor union to recover a· bonus of 
one-half their regular daily wage under the terms of a collee-
tive bargaining agreement by which a wage increase was made 
retroactive to a certain date and the time for commencing 
the "graveyard" shift was changed to II different hour, it was 
error to eXclude from evidence a letter executed and delivered 
simultaneously with the contract, by which the union agreed 
that the change in time of the "graveyard" shift did not com-
mence until more than a year after the retroactive date of the 
wage inerease, where such contract and letter related to the 
same subject matter, wages and working conditions, and were 
both a part of the same agreement. 
[21 Id.-Oollective Bargaining Oontracts-Interpretation.-Where 
a labor union entered into a collectivll bargaining agreement 
with moving picture producers governing wage seales and 
labor conditions and, at the same time as the contract was 
signed and delivered, also sent a letter to the producers agree-
ing that certain changes in such working conditions and wage 
scales should take effect as of a date different from that 
specified in the cqntract, a consideration of the letter was not 
objectionable as tending to vary the terms of the oontract, since 
the agreement was established by both the letter and ths 
contract and not by one to the. exclusion of the other. 
[1] See 7 Oal.Jur.l0-Yr.8upp. (1945 Rev.) 471; 31 Am.Jur. 878. 
:Hclt. Dig. Reference: (1-3] Labor, § Sa. 
) 
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[8] Id.-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Interpretation.-ln an 
action by members of a labor union to recover a bonus under 
a collective bargaining agreement between the union and cer-
tain moving picture producers, it was prejudicial error to ex-
clude evidence of the negotiations of the parties and the 
surrounding circumstances, where the contract and a eon-
temporaneous letter changing some of th~ terms of the contract 
were ambiguous as to whether the effective date of a change 
in the time of beginning a "graveyard" shift determined the 
starting date of the bonus payment accompanying such shift, 
or whether such bonus was retroactive to the same date as 
other wage increases. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Leo Freund, Judge pro tem.- Reversed. 
Action by members of labor union to recover bonus of one· 
haIf their regular daily wage under terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed. 
Loeb & Loeb, Keating Coffey, Adrian A. Kragen and Her-
man F. Selvin for Appellants. 
Mohr & Borstein and Alfred J. Borstein for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiffs brought this action to recover 
a bonus of one-half their regular daily wage allegedly due 
them for the period July 1,1941 to August 30, 1942, under the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement between Local 
728, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees 
and defendant motion picture studio. Defendant appeals 
from a judgment entered for plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs are members 9f Local 728. During the period for 
which compensation is sought they were employed by defend-
ant on its night rigging crew. With minor exceptions not here 
material, their work shift began at 9 p.m. During the fall 
and winter of 1941 negotiations for a new collective bargain-
ing agreement covering all the major studios in Hollywood. 
including defendant. were conducted between IATSE 
through its international representative and the business 
agents of the various Hollywood locals, and the studios 
through Fred Pelton as Producers' Labor Administrator and 
Pat Casey as chairman of the Motion Picture Producers' 
• AB8igned by Chairman ef Judicial Council. 
) 
824 MAYERS tI. LoEW'S, INO. [35 C.2d 
Association. They resulted in a tentative agreement in 
January, 1942, providing for a general 10 per cent wage 
increase for employees in all classifications. That increase 
was paid by the studios during 1942. Paragraph 6 of the 
agreement also provided: 
"6. Skifts-The Work Day shall be divided into four shifts 
of six hours each. First shift may start between six a.m. and 
eight a.m. Men called to start work two or more hours after 
the start of the third regular shift shall be considered as 
performing work on the fourth (graveyard) shift. 
"The first three shifts shall be paid for at straight time; 
the fourth (graveyard) shift at straight time plus a bonus of 
* time." 
Paragraph 53 of the agreement provided for the payment of 
wage increases retroactive to July 1, 1941. 
The bonus specified in paragraph 6 WItS retroactively pay-
able only to employees whose shifts began two or more hours 
after the starting time of the third shift. Since defendant'. 
third shift began at 8 p.m., plaintiffs, who came to work at 
9 p.m. during that period, were not" considered as performing 
work on the fourth (graveyard) shift," and consequently were 
not entitled to the bonus. 
Following the circulation of the tentative agreement the 
parties continued negotiations for a final agreement. From 
time to time as modifications in the tentative agreement were 
agreed upon, they were announced in bulletins issued by the 
producers' representatives. During the negotiations the 
parties agreed to establish a standard starting time for the 
graveyard shift to replace the variable time dependent on the 
starting time of the third shift then provided by paragraph 
6 of the tentative agreement. The new starting time was 
announced by a bulletin issued over Pelton's signature: 
"NOTICE To ALL ISTUDIOS 
fC August 24, 1942 
Subject: Standard Starting Time of • Graveya,.d Skifl.' 
Be : Wage Scales and Working Conditions for the 
following I.A.T.S.E. Unions. 
Q.-Local No. 80 - Grips 
R.-Local No. 728 - Lamp Operators 
T.-Local No. 44 - Property Craftsmen 
V.-Local No. 727 - Laborers 
X.-Local No. 165 - Projectionists 
Y.-Local No. 695 - SOWld Techniciau 
Aug. 1950] MAyERS tt. LoEW'S, INO; 
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•• Effective August 30, 1942, the first paragraph of Section 
6 in the above references will be replaced and superseded by 
the following: 
"6. Shifts-The Work Day shall be divided into four shifts 
of six hours each. First shift may start between six a.m. and 
eight a.m. Men called to start work at nine p.m. or later 
shall be considered as performing work on the fourth (grave-
yard) shift. 
F. E. PELTON" 
Workers reporting to work at 9 p.m. were thus newly 
classified as graveyard shift workers, and the effective date of 
the change was August 30, 1942. There was no reference to 
paragraph 53 providing that wage increases such as the grave-
yard shift bonus were to be paid retroactively to July 1, 1941. 
The tentative agreement and the modifying bulletins were 
sent to the printer for the printing of the formal contract. 
The printed copies of the formal contract were delivered to the 
union in January 1943, and were signed by the business agents 
of the locals. They were thereupon delivered to Pelton's office 
for the approval and signature of the representatives of the 
studios. Paragraph 6 of the formal contract provided a 9 
p.m. starting hour for the graveyard shift but did not provide 
an August 30, 1942 effective date as provided in the bulletin 
of August 24th. Paragraph 57 of the contract contained 
the same provision for retroactive payment of the wage 
increases as paragraph 53 of the tentative agreement. 
Before the agreement was signed by the studio representa-
tives or delivered to the union, Pelton dictated the following 
letter for signature by the business agents of the locals, includ-
ing A. J. Moran, business agent of Local 728: 
Mr. Pat Casey, Chairman 
Producers' Committee 
5504 Hollywood Boulevard 
Hollywood, California 
Dear Mr. Casey: 
., Hollywood, California 
February 1, 1943 
Notwithstanding the prOVISIons of Section 3 of the wage 
agreements dated February 15, 1942, between the various 
Motion Picture Producers whom you represent, and the under-
signed, the effective tlates of the 'working conditions' in such 
) 
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wage agreements shall be subject to the following bulletins 
issued by your office: 
Date Subject 
May 22, 1942 Meal Periods 
Aug. 24, 1942 Standard Starting Time of Graveyard Shift 
Aug. 25, 1942 Golden Hours 
Aug. 27. 1942 'On Call' Employees Split Week between 
Studio and Distant Location 
Aug. 28, 1942 Distant Location Definitions and Working 
Conditions 
Yours very truly, 
Studio Electrical Technicians 
Local 728 of the I.A..T.S.E. 
By A. J. MORAN " 
----------------
The prOVISIons of section 3 referred to in the letter are 
as follows: 
"3. Wage scales, bours and working conditions for Local 
728 sball be set forth in the 'Wage Scales and Working Condi-
tions' attached hereto and shall be effective as of February 15, 
1942, subject to the retroactive adjustments specified in said 
'Wage Scales and Working Conditions.' " 
Sometime between February 5th and February 8th, 1943, 
Moran went to Pelton's office to get his union's copies of the 
formal contract and received them after signing certain copies 
of the contract and the letter set forth above. 
Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to retroactive 
compensation from July 1, 1941, for work performed on the 
9 p.m. shift from that date under the terms of the formal 
contract. Defendant agrees that they are entitled to the bonus 
provided in paragraph 6 for all days worked after the August 
30, 1942, etiective date but contends that they are not entitled 
to the bonus for days worked beginning at 9 p.m. before 
that date for the 'reason that they were not "considered as 
performing work on the fourth (graveyard) shift" untn 
9 p.m. became the starting time of that shift on August 30th. 
In defendant's view, the formal agreement and the letter of 
February 'I, 1943, incorporating the etiective date of the 
August 24th bulletin therein must be read and construed 
together as a single integrated contract under Civil Code, 
section 1642·. It is urged that the contract and the letter 
••• Several eontraets relating to the same matters, between the same 
parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be 
taken together." 
) 
) 
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construed together provide for bonus payments to employees 
starting work at 9 p.m. or later after August 30, 1942, and 
that before that date the bonus payments are payable only 
to employees starting work two or more hours after the start of 
the regular third shift, in this ease, at 10 p.m. or later. 
The trial court refused to consider the letter or the bulletin 
of August 24th in its interpretation of the agreement because it 
concluded "that said letter and the bulletin to which it 
referred purported to change, contradict, modify, vary and 
alter the provisions of the formal collective bargaining agree-
ment above mentioned with respect to retroactive pay," and 
that "said letter was not a part of the formal collective bar-
gaining agreement but was extrinsic and collateral thereto. tt 
Relying solely on paragraphs 6 and 57 of the formal contract, 
the trial court ordered judgment for plaintiffs for bonus pay-
ments retroactively to July 1, 1941. 
[1] The conclusion of the trial court that the letter and 
the bulletin were not part of the formal contract is clearly 
contrary to the undisputed evidence before it. That evidence 
demonstrates conclusively that the formal contract and the 
letter of February 1st were executed and delivered at the 
same time. They related to the same subject matter, wages and 
working conditions of IA TSE members employed by the 
studios. They were delivered at the same time with the express 
purpose of incorporating the effective dates of the specified 
bulletins into the provisions of the formal contract. "Where 
two or more written instruments are executed contempora-
neously, with reference to the other, for the purpose of attain-
ing a preconceived object. they must all be construed together, 
and effect given if possible to the purpose to be accomplished." 
(People v. Ganahl Lumber 00., 10 Ca1.2d 501, 507 [75 P.2d 
1067] ; Symonds v. Sherman, 219 Cal. 249, 253 [26 P.2d 293] ; 
Tuso v. Green, 194 Cal. 574, 581 [229 P. 327] ; Burr v. Westem 
States Life Ins. 00., 211 Cah 568, 575 [296 P. 273] ; Shattuck 
v. Ohase, 86 Cal.App.2d 810, 813 [195 P.2d 475] ; Reid v . • John-
,on, 85 Cal.App.2d 112, 115-116 [192 P.2d 106) ; Holbrook v. 
Fazio, 84 Cal.App.2d 700, 701 [191 P.2d 123] ; Body-Steffne,. 
00. v. Flottil Products, 63 Cal.App.2d 555, 560 [147 P.2d 84) ; 
Lynch v. Bank of America, 2 Cal.App.2d 214, 223 [37 P.2d 
716} ; Basile v. Oalifornia Packing Oorp., 25 F.2d 576, 577; 1 
Restatement, Contracts, § 235, pp. 319, 322-323.) Since the 
purpose of the agreements may be ascertained only by refer-
ence to each of the documents executed to accomplish that 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
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purpose, it was error to exclude any of those documents from 
eonsideration. 
[2] The consideration of the letter of February 1st in the 
interpretation of the formal contract is not objectionable on 
the ground that it tends to vary, modify, or contradict the 
terms of that contract. Those terms are established by the 
contract and the letter and not by one to the exclusion of the 
other. By the express provision of the letter the contract must 
be read as if it specifically provided that the provisions of 
paragraph 6 with respect to the starting time of the graveyard 
shift became effective August 30, 1942. It must therefore 
be determined whether the parties meant that the payment of 
retroactive compensation based on paragraph 6 should be 
governed by the effective date thereof or by the earlier date 
of July 1, 1941, established by paragraph 57. 
The trial court, on· plaintiffs' objection, excluded evidence 
of the negotiations of the parties offered by defendant for the 
purpose of establishing the meaning that the union and the 
studios attributed to the effective date of the new starting 
time. Defendant contends that the excluded evidence would 
establish that the parties meant that the new starting time 
would be effective August 30th and that this date would govern 
the payment of retroactive compensation under the contract. 
[3] The agreements in the present case are ambiguous and 
internally inconsistent. Paragraph 57 of the formal contract 
provides for the retroactive payment of wage increases to 
July 1, 1941. Paragraph 6 as modified by the letter of Febru-
ary 1st provides that the graveyard shift shall start at 9 p.m. 
and that a bonus shall be paid to all employees starting work 
at that hour or later, but by its terms it is not effective until 
August 30, 1942. Is the payment of retroactive compensation 
to graveyard shift employees governed by paragraph 57 and 
thus payable to employees who were not considered as perform-
ing work on the graveyard shift at the time the work was 
performed T Or is the payment of retroactive compensation 
limited by the provision that the new starting time is effective 
August 30, 1942, so that before that date the graveyard 
bonus is payable only to persons considered as performing 
work on the graveyard shift at the time the work was per-
formed,· that is, those starting work two or more hours after 
the start of the third regular shift? Paragraph 3 of the formal 
contract provides that wage scales and worldn~ conditions 
therein provided are effective February ]5. 1942, subject to 
the retroactive adjustments specified in paragraph 57. The 
) 
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letter of February 1st provides that, "notwithstanding the 
proYisions of Section 3," the effective date of the new starting 
time of the graveyard shift shall be August 30, 1942. Did the 
parties thereby intend to supplant only the effective date speci· 
fied in paragraph 3, February 15, 1942, or did they intend to 
supplant the whole of paragraph 3, including the provision that 
wage scales and working conditions are "subject to the retro-
active adjustments specified" in paragraph 57 t The terms of 
the agreement furnish no clear answer to these questions. It 
is thus apparent that the contract is not clear on its face. 
and nnder the theory of the parol evidence rule that hali . 
been accepted by the majority of this court,evidence of the 
negotiations of the parties and of surrounding circumstances 
was admissible for the purpose of determining the meaning' of 
the contractual provisions. (Universal Sales cOrp. v. Cali· 
fornia Press Mfg. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761·762 [128 P-.2d 665] ; 
California Canning Peach Growers v. Williams, 11 Ca1.2d 221. 
228·229 [78 P.2d 11541; Merkeley v. Fisk, 179 Cal. 748, 757 
[178 P. 9451 ; see Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar Co., 31 Ca1.2d 
300, 306, 307 [188 P.2d 470]; Body-Steffner Co. v. Flotill 
Products, 63 Cal.App.2d 555, 561-562 [147 P.2d 84] ; Torrey 
v. Shea, 29 Cal.App. 313, 316-317 [155 P. 820]; Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1860; Civ. Code, § 1647.) That evidence would have 
supported a construction of the contract favorable to defend-
ant and it should have been considered by the trial court 
in its interpretation of the terms of the contract. Exclusion 
of that evidence was therefore prejudicial error. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter. J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, -J .• concurred. 
Respondents' petition~!ora -ieIiearmg-wikidemed-Septeniber 
21,1950. 
